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The civil war newsbook the Scotish Dove – which appeared weekly from the London press of 
Laurence Chapman between October 1643 and the end of 1646 – has recently been described 
as the voice of the Scottish interest, and even as the “first Scottish newspaper.” It is said to 
have prompted “a consistently and resolutely Scottish perspective,” and one of its prime aims 
is said to have been to “describe, defend, celebrate and when necessary apologise for” the 
Scots and the army of the covenant. Commentators agree that this involved “cloying piety” 
and “unpleasantness,” and that its author was “a blue nose, a Puritan in the worst sense of the 
word,” even if they might not all go as far as to suggest that it was the mouthpiece for the 
Scottish commissioners in London, or that it represented “effective public relations” for the 
Scottish political and religious agenda.1 It has proved tempting, in other words, to see the 
Dove as part of a wider story which centres upon the Scots as aggressive appropriators and 
exploiters of print culture, and as being peculiarly interested in, and capable of, using texts to 
reach out to different groups in different countries. According to this version of the “print 
revolution,” the “explosion” of print that occurred in the mid-seventeenth century involved “a 
forest fire, started in Edinburgh,” and one of “the most systematic and concerted campaigns 
hitherto attempted by a foreign power to bombard a separate kingdom with propaganda, 
thereby using the printed word to manipulate political opinion and fundamentally to alter the 
                                                 
1 A. Williamson, “Scotland: international politics, international press,” in Agent of Change, 
eds. S. Baron, E. Lindquist and E. Shevlin (Amherst, 2007), 193-215, at 202, 204, 205-6; J. 
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political process of another nation.”2 As such, the story of the Scotish Dove seems to 
encapsulate the idea that Scottish covenanters were in the vanguard of the English revolution, 
and to fit with a certain kind of approach to the “British problem,” in which the Scots are 
regarded as a kind of deus ex machina, or at the very least as a “billiard ball” which crashed 
powerfully and decisively into the English body politic.3  
This article accepts that there is mileage in using the Scotish Dove to address a more 
or less serious lacuna in recent work on early modern political culture, but does so for rather 
different reasons. It is based upon the idea that, amid all of the scholarly interest in, and 
debates about, the emergence of a “public sphere,” whether Habermasian or not, too little has 
been done to explore the ways in which texts moved across state boundaries in order to 
engage with multiple constituencies or “publics,” and the possibilities that existed for 
promoting transterritorial publics, in terms of communities with shared aims and 
collaborative intentions, which could be mobilised, brought into being and given expression 
by printed means. The aim is to analyse attempts to exploit, foster, enlarge, and sustain a 
British public – a constituency of people across England, Scotland and perhaps Ireland – that 
did or might support attempts to promote Anglo-Scottish union not just through church 
reform but also through state-building and cross-border political institutions. Such a public 
does not need to be conceived of as being separate from official political bodies – “the state” 
– in a Habermasian sense, but rather as something that was intended to be a social reality, 
albeit one which might need to be promoted by political elites (and others) through the 
medium of print, and one whose real or intended ideals and attitudes could also be expressed 
                                                 
2 Raymond, Pamphlets, 172; D. Como, “Secret printing, the crisis of 1640, and the origins of 
civil war radicalism,” Past and Present 196 (August 2007): 37-82, at 57.  
3 C. Russell, The Causes of the English Civil War (Oxford, 1990); C. Russell, The Fall of the 
British Monarchies, 1637-1642 (Oxford, 1991). 
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in a range of printed official and non-official texts.4 As such, the purpose is partly to rethink 
the historiography relating to the dynamics of British history, by challenging assumptions 
that the “British problem” involved discrete polities and publics, and to move beyond 
unhelpful debates about “Anglo-centricity” and “Scottish moments,” in terms of whether the 
political initiative lay with the Scots or the English. Indeed, the aim is to rethink the story of 
Anglo-Scottish relations during the 1640s, which are too easily portrayed as involving 
Scottish attempts to influence English affairs, parliamentarian attempts to persuade the Scots 
to join a military alliance against Charles I, and a difficult relationship which subsequently 
faltered over conflicting views of church reform before collapsing over the terms of a 
political settlement during 1646-8.5 This will not necessarily involve ignoring the substantive 
issues at stake, although it will place greater emphasis than is usual on the possibility for 
federal political union, and it will certainly focus on the ways in which cooperation took 
place and was promoted. And it will involve suggesting that by focusing on Anglo-Scottish 
print culture – texts created in England and Scotland for audiences that extended across both 
                                                 
4 See: S. Waurechen, “Covenanting propaganda and conceptualisations of the public during 
the Bishops’ wars, 1638-1640,” Historical Journal 52, no. 1 (March 2009): 63-86. 
5 A. Macinnes, “The ‘Scottish moment’, 1638-45,” in The English Civil War, ed. J. Adamson 
(Basingstoke, 2009), 125-42; L. Kaplan, Politics and Religion during the English Revolution 
(New York, 1976). For recent revisions of this picture, see: E. Vernon, “A ministry of the 
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(Manchester, 2013), 170-89. 
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countries and that reflected on Anglo-Scottish relations – it is possible not only to recover 
evidence of cross-border collaboration and cooperation, of a kind that was fostered both 
within and beyond official circles, and then to relate this to the constitutional changes that 
accompanied the revolution (not least the creation of the Committee of Both Kingdoms), but 
also to suggest that the mid-seventeenth century reveals a symbiotic relationship between 
developments in print culture and changes in institutional structures.6 What this means, 
firstly, is that British state formation was partly responsive to the existence of what might be 
called a pre-existing British (or Anglo-Scottish) public, which involved a constituency of 
opinion about political as well as religious reform, and which was fostered by and expressed 
in print. Secondly, it means that the development of “British” institutions made it 
increasingly important to engage with a wider community of citizens, and thirdly it means 
that print was also central to the process of navigating tensions between covenanters and 
parliamentarians, not least in relation to institutional change, and indeed to the fracturing of 
this public. As such, the argument of this paper is that cross-border print culture was central 
not just to the rise and fall of an Anglo-Scottish public, but also to both the achievement and 
ultimate failure of British union in the 1640s. 
 
Covenanter propaganda and Anglo-Scottish cooperation 
Although there is little reason to doubt that the Covenanters were “creative communicators,” 
who had deliberately set about creating a “covenanter public,” or to question the effectiveness 
of their propaganda strategies and practices for making an impact on English audiences, it 
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can certainly be argued that the nature of this campaign has been analysed in rather narrow 
ways.7 
What is well-known is that the campaign to distribute Scottish texts across England 
involved considerable energy and resources. In noting that the covenanters “aimed an intense 
propaganda barrage at England,” David Stevenson long ago pointed out that their printer, 
Robert Bryson, was paid £166 (Scots) “for his expenses, service and hazard in going in 
through England with the said books.”8 It is also widely recognized that such efforts made 
significant waves in England, in the sense that copies of texts were widely dispersed and 
provoked both concern and action on the part of the authorities. John Castle, for example, 
informed the earl of Bridgewater that Covenanters had “cast and spread abroad into this 
kingdom above 10,000 printed copies” of their “pestilent pasquil,” thus “making their cause 
to be common,” and in March 1640 it was discovered that the Scots planned to disperse as 
many as 2,000 copies of An Information from the Estates into England, “to make their cause 
good and their grievances intolerable.”9 As English officials became worried about the 
impact of such texts, Charles I sent an urgent circular to deputy lieutenants, denouncing 
“wicked and traiterous” pamphlets which had been “clandestinely sent into this our kingdom 
and spread in sundry parts thereof,” while loyal JPs across the country sent up to London 
copies of Scottish texts that had been discovered and handed in.10 Little could be done, 
                                                 
7 For the attempt to create a “covenanter public” within Scotland, see: L. Stewart, Rethinking 
the Scottish Revolution. Covenanted Scotland, 1637-1651 (Oxford, 2016), 30, 256. 
8 D. Stevenson, “A revolutionary regime and the press: the Scottish Covenanters and their 
printers, 1638-51,” The Library 6th series, no. 7 (1985): 315-37, at 323, 325. 
9 EL 7847, EL 7849, Huntington Library, San Marino. 
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English Revolution (Cambridge, 2013), 25-7. 
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however, to prevent the Scots from becoming boastful about the impact of their propaganda 
on English public life.11 
 In examining covenanter attempts to promote Anglo-Scottish unity and a shared 
public sphere, however, there is a tendency to overlook the role of the covenanters’ friends 
and sympathizers within England, and a holistic approach to covenanter propaganda must 
recognize the importance of Anglo-Scottish cooperation. Attention thus needs to be paid to 
Englishmen who were involved in distributing such material, like Mr Guard and Thomas 
Audley, as well to the enthusiastic readers who devoured it. These included men like the 
schoolmaster of King’s Norton, Thomas Hall, and the Northamptonshire lawyer and Puritan, 
Robert Woodford, who was appalled by the prospect of the Bishops’ Wars, who devoured 
news and rumors about events in Scotland, and who read texts by and about covenanter 
“brethren.” Woodford, indeed, had “much discourse” about “the Scottish business,” not just 
with Englishmen who had recently been north of the border, but also with Alexander 
Henderson and Archibald Johnston of Wariston when they visited England. However, it also 
included humble soldiers and troopers, like those whose stories emerged during an 
investigation into reports that copies of Information from the Scottish Nation had been found 
hidden in a churchyard in Braintree (Essex) in the summer of 1640. What emerged was the 
existence of a clandestine communication network which was used to spread such texts, 
which brought together humble and semi-literate clothiers and carpenters as well as soldiers 
who were billeted in the area, not least in local inns and taverns, where information about the 
whereabouts of illicit texts could circulate with ease.12 Moreover, while it would be wrong to 
                                                 
11 Waurechen, “Covenanting propaganda,” 78-9. 
12 The Autobiography and Library of Thomas Hall BD (1610-1665), ed. Denise Thomas 
(Worcestershire Historical Society, new series, volume 26, 2015), 316, 322-5, 345, 355; The 
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discount the significance of covenanter printing in the Low Countries, which clearly provides 
a fascinating example of the relationship between printed texts and state borders, here too it is 
necessary to recognize the importance of Anglo-Scottish cooperation. As David Como has 
demonstrated, the so-called Cloppenburg press – upon which key covenanter pamphlets like 
the one found in Braintree were printed – actually operated in London rather than in the 
Dutch republic, as a secretive and collaborative venture by various Londoners. Indeed, what 
is intriguing about the Cloppenburg press, like other printing that did take place in the Dutch 
republic, is that it involved a mixture of English and Scottish texts – by Henry Burton, 
William Prynne, John Bastwick, and Henry Parker as well as by George Gillespie and Robert 
Baillie – and a nexus of English clerics, printers, and booksellers (John Canne, Matthew 
Simmons, Richard Whitaker, and Thomas Crafford), as well as exiled Scottish ministers.13 
Finally, too little attention has been paid to the fact that from late 1636 to early 1638 one of 
the things that concerned men like Archbishop William Laud was evidence that English 
Puritan texts – by William Prynne and John Bastwick – were being sent into Scotland to 
encourage the covenanters.14 
This all points to the existence and development of an Anglo-Scottish community – 
the geographical reach and social depth of which has not been properly assessed – which was 
                                                                                                                                                        
2012), 200, 207, 227, 261, 274, 281, 285, 288, 290-1, 294-5, 297, 312, 325, 366, 368, 378, 
386; Peacey, Print and Public Politics, 25-7; Calendar of State Papers Domestic 1640, 622, 
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13 Como, “Secret printing”; S. Foster, Notes from the Caroline Underground (Hamden, 
Conn., 1978), 73-8; K. Sprunger, Trumpets from the Tower (Leiden, 1994), 98-105; Newes 
from Scotland (Amsterdam, 1638). 
14 The Works of the Most Reverend Father in God, William Laud, ed. J. H. Parker (7 vols., 
New York, 1975), vii. 300-302; TNA, SP 16/583, fol. 82v. 
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based on cross-border cooperation and shared interests, and which helped to foster the 
existence of a meaningful constituency – an Anglo-Scottish public – that operated and 
thought collaboratively. This cross-border public involved both a discursive space (i.e. texts 
which reflected on shared interests and goals) and a social reality, in the sense that it is 
possible to observe both texts and arguments that reflected on shared interests and goals, as 
well as individuals who were interested in promoting collaborative efforts in the peculiar 
politico-religious conjuncture that existed in England and Scotland during the late 1630s and 
early 1640s. This was a conjuncture, moreover, which needs to be recognized as involving 
not merely ideas and debates about church reform and about the possibility of creating a 
shared Presbyterian church, but also ideas about federal political union and new civil 
institutions. Thus, rather than thinking simplistically about an English audience for Scottish 
propaganda which was intended to promote a Presbyterian religious agenda, it is necessary to 
analyze cross-border cooperation between committed “brethren,” in order to mobilize as 
much as to create support for action across Britain that would promote both church reform 
and political action against Stuart policies, not least through institutional reform. It makes 
sense, in other words, to think about this “public” as a body of people across Britain whose 
support was being courted, and also as a pre-existing cross-border godly community that was 
being mustered, rather than conjured, with the help of “covenanter” texts.  
The recovery of this more complicated picture of Anglo-Scottish print culture 
provides a means, as Como has shown, of challenging the claims made by “revisionists” – 
and some Scottish historians – about the nature of the British problem and of the political 
dynamic within the British Isles before 1642.15 However, it is also possible to suggest that 
this Anglo-Scottish public provided foundational support for enhanced cross-border 
cooperation and state-building thereafter, in the conditions of civil war. Here too, in other 
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words, there are grounds for thinking more deeply about the relationship between print and 
political borders, and about the light that can be shed on contemporary political culture more 
broadly, by highlighting the English – rather than merely Scottish – voices who advocated 
closer political cooperation. This is a process that can be detected from the earliest weeks of 
the war, not least in terms of the role of Henry Parker’s Generall Junto as a somewhat 
discrete means of providing English support for confederal union, and indeed one that would 
be British, rather than merely Anglo-Scottish.16 It also became much more notable in the 
wake of the Solemn League and Covenant (1643), the weeks following the signing of which 
saw authors like Edward Bowles advocating “a speedy and firm union with the counsels and 
strength of Scotland,” and Hezekiah Woodward promoting the idea of Three Kingdoms Made 
One.17  
 
Anglo-Scottish print culture 
More importantly, the move towards institutional union, at least in the sense of creating 
specific federal bodies like the Committee of Both Kingdoms in February 1644, can be 
shown to have increased the need for a cross-border community or public, thereby ensuring 
that print became a vital tool for nurturing and fostering support for Anglo-Scottish 
cooperation. Here too, in other words, there are reasons for exploring the relationship 
between print and state borders, and for arguing that covenanter propagandizing in England 
was only part of the story, not least by scrutinizing both the practices and the messages 
involved in addressing an Anglo-Scottish public. In terms of printing processes, therefore, it 
                                                 
16 J. Peacey, “The politics of British union in 1642 and the purpose of civil war pamphlets,” 
Historical Research 80, no. 210 (November3 2007): 491-517. 
17 E. Bowles, The Mysterie of Iniquitie (London, 1643, B3876), 47; H. Woodward, Three 
Kingdoms made One (London, 1643, W3507). 
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is important to recognize the complexity of Anglo-Scottish propaganda, and that texts moved 
in both directions, in different ways and for different reasons.18 
This can be done, firstly, through the audited accounts of the covenanter printer, Evan 
Tyler, between 1642 and 1647, which itemize over 100 different items, involving 130,000 
sheets of paper and a claim for £13,000 (Scots), or almost £1,100 (English).19 What is 
intriguing here is not just that Tyler was an English printer, whose Scottish presses were – at 
least from 1647 – controlled by the Stationers’ Company in London, but also that he was 
primarily involved in producing English texts for Scottish readers, including 1,000 copies of 
what he described as “some proceedings betwixt the king and Parliament,” as well as 
statements by the “dissenting brethren” and the Westminster Assembly, texts by the English 
parliament in their paper war with the king, and statements by the House of Lords in response 
to London Presbyterian petitioning in 1646, not to mention parliamentary texts that were 
directed towards the Scottish authorities.20 
                                                 
18 Stewart, Scottish Revolution, 271. 
19 PA 15/2, National Records of Scotland. 
20 Here (and in subsequent footnotes), references too numerous to cite in full are indicated by 
means of a standard bibliographical reference, from the English Short Title Catalogue 
(ESTC): E1448; R574; E2175; E2788A; E1448; E1437A; W1440A; W1430; W1435. This 
would become much more marked in the later 1640s, not least when Tyler reprinted a number 
of Presbyterian ministers’ petitions from across England. See: ESTC S2605; B5691; G886; 
H800B; H1315. Such texts, however, were not included in Tyler’s inventory, which raises 
questions about the degree to which his press retained a degree of independence from the 
covenanter authorities. For Tyler and the Stationers’ Company, see: Stevenson, 
“Revolutionary regime,” 327.  
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Secondly, Tyler’s republishing of official parliamentarian texts represented only a 
fraction of the English material which made its way to Scotland, and while the extent of the 
cross-border traffic in texts from south to north is difficult to establish with certainty, it 
clearly involved not just official attempts to export such material, but also Scottish demand 
for English pamphlets and newsbooks, which were printed and sold commercially. Thus, 
while some texts flowed through official channels, including texts produced by the 
Westminster Assembly of Divines, it also seems that works by English authors such as 
Francis Quarles (the royalist poet) and George Wither (the parliamentarian poet), as well as 
some early newspapers, were produced in Scotland in a more entrepreneurial fashion, by 
printers like James Lindsay and booksellers like Andrew Wilson.21  
Thirdly, while it is clear that some of Tyler’s Edinburgh texts made it to London, not 
least because they ended up in George Thomason’s collection, a much more significant way 
in which Scottish pamphlets reached English audiences involved English presses, operated by 
a select band of the covenanters’ friends, allies, and accomplices in London.22 The most 
notable of these was Robert Bostock, a considerable proportion of whose time was spent 
reprinting official covenanter texts – by the Convention of Estates and the General Assembly 
of the Kirk – that had earlier appeared from Tyler’s press in Edinburgh.23 Indeed, it is 
perfectly clear that Bostock, who very obviously had Presbyterian sympathies, worked 
closely with the Scottish commissioners in London, from whom he evidently received many 
of the texts – including news – which he published.24 Bostock was not alone, however, and 
other London stationers who formed part of the covenanters’ English network included Ralph 
                                                 
21 See: ESTC W1424; Q50A, W3146a. 
22 See: ESTC S1132; S1051; D519; C4227A; S1300A. 
23 See: ESTC S1035, S1137, L1873, R442, H1436, P3474, S1187, C4255, T2072, P3474. 
24 See: ESTC N843, S1231, S1346; H1436. 
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Smith and another prominent London Presbyterian, John Bellamy, both of whom reprinted 
covenanter manifestos.25 Crucially, moreover, the Scots also developed significant ties to 
other Englishmen who were associated with the press, such as the minister – and press 
licenser – James Cranford, to whose role it will be necessary to return. 
Fourthly, it is also vital to recognize that the development of the Anglo-Scottish 
public involved efforts on the part of the English authorities as much as it did the work of 
Scottish covenanters. The English Parliament devoted considerable resources to bringing the 
two publics together, and its official printer, Edward Husband, regularly reprinted Scottish 
texts which had first been produced by Tyler in Edinburgh.26 Similarly, the City of London’s 
official printer, Richard Cotes, produced new versions of texts that had been sent to the civic 
authorities by the covenanter regime, while Bostock, like the partnership of Bellamy and 
Smith, also produced a series of Scottish texts upon the direct orders of Parliament,27 and 
another bookseller, Edward Brewster, produced Scottish texts which received the imprimatur 
of English licensers, even if he did not work directly for Parliament.28 
 Moreover, while it is possible that other printers may also have worked covertly for 
the authorities in Whitehall and Westminster, or for the Scots’ commissioners, the volume of 
material that emerged in England, and the sizeable cast of characters involved, makes it hard 
to avoid the conclusion that London’s presses were commercially motivated as well as 
politically manipulated. Thus, while Thomas Underhill – who reprinted certain papers of the 
Convention of Estates, as well as works by Robert Baillie – had connections with the English 
                                                 
25 See: ESTC S1292, K336A. See: Hughes, “‘The remembrance of sweet fellowship,’” 174. 
26 See: ESTC S1339B; S1198A; S1491; S1139B. 
27 See: ESTC C4231B; T1666; W1443B; E2388. 
28 ESTC L1542. 
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parliament, he was not an official printer,29 and on other occasions documents from the 
authorities in Edinburgh, as well as speeches and papers by the Scottish commissioners in 
London, were printed and reprinted in ways which suggest either entrepreneurial or 
ideological motives, by a range of stationers like Gregory Dexter, Henry Overton, Samuel 
Gellibrand, Richard Whitaker, Hugh Perry, Lawrence Chapman, Thomas Paine, Matthew 
Simmons, Ralph Austin, and Humphrey Tuckey, as well as Elizabeth Purslowe.30 
 In other words, unless we are to believe that the work of this somewhat diverse range 
of stationers – many of whom were relatively minor players in London publishing circles – 
was being coordinated by political authorities in Edinburgh and London, it would seem likely 
that such activity indicates a widespread interest in, and determination to discuss, Anglo-
Scottish affairs, and perhaps even spontaneous support for Anglo-Scottish cooperation within 
England. As such, the process whereby Scottish texts appeared before English audiences can 
be thought not just to have been inspired by cross-border political cooperation, and the 
creation of the Committee of Both Kingdoms, but also to have involved something more than 
merely the export of texts from Scotland to England, or an effort by Scots to propagandize to 
an English audience. Rather, it involved a much more complex situation, in which texts 
moved in both directions through the efforts of both Englishmen and Scotsmen, either to 
capitalize on interest in the new political conjuncture, or to express a sense of common 
purpose. 
   
Publicizing Anglo-Scottish cooperation 
 
                                                 
29 See: ESTC S1135; S1182; B470. 
30 See: ESTC C4201aA; M796; S2125; L3090; S1290; S1301; S1291; S1337; C4202B; 
C4202AB; C4254; P3645. 
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However, just as important as the channels through which such material flowed is what can 
be revealed about the nature of the Anglo-Scottish public from the rhetoric of such texts. In 
part, this involves recognizing how the movement of texts across borders blurred the 
distinctions between Scottish and English audiences. Texts such as The Scotch Counsellor, 
for example, were framed as – and may genuinely have involved – correspondence between 
friends in Scotland and England, the latter of whom were sometimes portrayed as needing to 
be persuaded to remain loyal to Parliament, not least by invoking “the great comfort and 
content that we have received each from other these many years.”31 Pamphlets that were 
initially used to address Scottish readers, meanwhile, took on new and interesting meanings 
when they were reprinted in London, as references to “the subjects of this kingdom,” or to 
“all estates and degrees of persons throughout the land,” became stripped of straightforward 
national or geographical connotations.32 
However, it also involves recognizing the degree to which Anglo-Scottish print 
culture focused on the workings and viability of the Anglo-Scottish alliance. This is 
important because of a lingering sense within the historiography that the most well-known 
aspects of Anglo-Scottish discourse in the early 1640s – relating to church reform, 
Presbyterianism, Independency, and sectarianism – might be thought to emphasize the degree 
to which Anglo-Scottish relations revolved around a more or less distinctively Scottish 
perspective coming into conflict with a more or less determined English resistance to Scottish 
ideas, not least over church reform.33 Looked at in a different way, however, a somewhat 
different picture emerges. To a very large degree, therefore, the aim behind a considerable 
body of Anglo-Scottish material was to promote the idea that the new kind of political 
                                                 
31 The Scotch Counsellor (London, 1643, A3090), sig. Av. 
32 See: ESTC S1491; K336A; C4227A. 
33 A. Macinnes, The British Revolution, 1629-1660 (Basingstoke, 2005), 152-84. 
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structures and relationships that emerged during the 1640s were workable and profitable. 
Occasionally, this involved joint statements by covenanters and parliamentarians, which were 
ordered to be printed in both London and Edinburgh.34 At other moments it involved copies 
of sermons by Scottish ministers that were delivered before the English Parliament – not least 
giving thanks for Anglo-Scottish military success – being printed more or less officially both 
in London and Edinburgh.35 In addition, the Scots clearly used English friends like John 
Bellamy and Ralph Smith to provide evidence of cooperation between Parliament, the 
Convention of Estates, and the General Assembly, and used men like Robert Bostock to 
reveal evidence about the activities of both the English commissioners in Scotland and the 
Scots commissioners in London, as well as about the functioning of the Committee of Both 
Kingdoms as a vehicle for Anglo-Scottish cooperation.36 However, this message also 
emerged from any number of other pamphlets, produced more or less independently by 
London presses, which painted a picture of an effective relationship, and of friendly 
discussions involving the General Assembly and the Westminster Assembly.37  
Beyond this, a range of texts expressed the harmony of interests between Englishmen 
and Scotsmen, as well as mutual respect and admiration. From October 1643 onwards, 
therefore, the English Parliament repeatedly used print to stress that “the more speedy ending 
of these unhappy differences” depended on “the willingness of our brethren the Scots to stand 
up with them in the defense of the Protestant religion, our laws and liberties, against the 
desperate designs of papists and other ill-affected persons,” as well as to encourage financial 
support for the Scottish army, and to explain how English taxes (assessments) would be used 
                                                 
34 See: ESTC D691; D693. 
35 ESTC H1442. 
36 See: ESTC E2388; L1783; C4255. 
37 See: ESTC C4201aA; M796; C4235. 
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to fund covenanter forces.38 Texts originating in Scotland, meanwhile, stressed the 
importance of “joint counsels and assistance of both kingdoms, against the common enemies 
of both nations.”39 In May 1646, meanwhile, following the king’s surrender to the Scots and 
the suggestion that the “disposal” of the king was a matter for the English parliament, and 
that the covenanter army should be disbanded, the City of London arranged for the printing of 
its “humble remonstrance and petition” to Parliament, which expressed the hope of 
Presbyterians that “we may not… forget our brethren of Scotland.” This was subsequently 
republished by Bellamy at the behest of Presbyterians in both the City and Parliament, 
complete with a response in which members of the Lords insisted on “the continuance of that 
union between us and our brethren of Scotland.”40 At the behest of the City, meanwhile, 
Richard Cotes published a response to the remonstrance by the Scottish General Assembly, 
which likewise reflected on the importance of “union,” rather than merely on the need to deal 
with the threat posed by the sects.41 
 More important still were efforts to publicize evidence about the impact of the Anglo-
Scottish alliance as a result of the mobilization of Scottish forces. Parliament, therefore, 
ensured that Edward Husband produced evidence about the steps taken by the Scottish estates 
to raise loans and taxes “for the maintenance of an army of ten thousand men,”42 while many 
of the Scottish texts that appeared in England stressed “brotherly affection,” and their zeal for 
“carrying on the war” and for a “firm and lasting peace,” as well as their determination to 
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“live and die with their brethren of England.”43 Indeed, the covenanters used Bostock to 
convince English readers that they recognized “the necessity of our speedy marching to the 
assistance of our brethren in England,” and to provide evidence about The Readinesse of the 
Scots to Advance into England. This meant demonstrating that they were intent on providing 
meaningful military support, not least by ensuring that Bostock reprinted the legislation by 
which the Convention of Estates planned to raise money to supply their forces and put 
Scotland “into a posture of defence, for strengthening the army, and providing of arms and 
ammunition to the kingdom.”44 It also meant printing evidence about the mobilization of 
Scottish forces, in terms of their rendezvous near Berwick in December 1643, “with a body 
of 25,000 horse and foot.”45 
 Bostock, indeed, went to great lengths to ensure the publication of positive news 
about the Scottish army. During 1644, therefore, he produced a numbered series of news 
pamphlets with the assistance of Edward Bowles, in order to demonstrate the activity of the 
Committee of Both Kingdoms and the zeal of the Scottish army, and also to report on their 
advance into England, complete with details about the composition of Covenanter forces and 
intelligence regarding their progress.46 In February 1644, the English Parliament used 
Bostock’s press to publicize orders for a day of thanksgiving, for God’s “great goodness in 
sending so seasonably to our aid our brethren of Scotland, and in giving so great an absolute 
victory under the forces for the parliament, near Nantwich in Cheshire.”47 In April 1645, 
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meanwhile, Bostock produced An Extract of Severall Letters from Scotland, involving 
evidence secured from the Scottish commissioners in London which related to “the defeat 
given to the rebels” under the earl of Montrose.48 Such evidence was then quickly recycled by 
Husband, alongside an official order for a day of thanksgiving “for the great blessing God 
hath given our brethren of Scotland.”49 Similar texts also emerged from Bostock’s press 
during the months that followed, not least following the covenanter victory over Scottish 
royalists at the Battle of Philiphaugh and the defeat inflicted on English royalists by Scottish 
forces at Hereford, while in February 1646, Bostock drew further attention to Covenanter 
zeal by relating the story of Treason and Rebellion and the execution of “several traitors and 
rebels” in Edinburgh.50 
 Of course, this effort on both sides to stress the importance and effectiveness of the 
Anglo-Scottish alliance was made necessary in part by nervousness that support for the Scots 
within England might be fragile. It would thus be rash to deny that texts from all sides sought 
to correct “mistakes and prejudices” concerning the honesty of the covenanter regime and the 
effectiveness (and behavior) of their troops.51 The Scots certainly felt compelled to explain 
the reasons for their delayed mobilization and slow military progress, and some of Tyler’s 
texts which were carried into England addressed the issue of complaints regarding “many 
insolencies and wrongs done… by foot companies and horse-troops, their officers and 
soldiers, under pretext of taking quarters,” and also publicized the steps taken to prevent such 
abuses.52 For much the same reason, Tyler also produced another text, which Bostock then 
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reprinted, containing the Scottish version of the Articles and Ordinances of Warre, for the 
present expedition of the army of the kingdome of Scotland, while Tyler produced Scottish 
acts against unnecessary or over burdensome free quarter.53 Nevertheless, there is clear 
evidence that the Anglo-Scottish alliance that emerged in the wake of the Solemn League and 
Covenant, and that was cemented by the creation of the Committee of Both Kingdoms, 
witnessed considerable efforts by both parliamentarians and Covenanters to convince both 
English and Scottish audiences of the value of “union,” whether religious or political. 
 
The fracturing of the Anglo-Scottish relationship 
The problem, however, was that as time passed more and more effort needed to be expended 
addressing tensions between English and Scottish brethren – over the desirability of either a 
unified Presbyterian church or federal political institutions – in ways which indicate that print 
became central not just to the promotion of an Anglo-Scottish public, but also to dealing with 
the difficulties involved in cross-border political cooperation and state-building, and to the 
process by which the alliance eventually fractured.54 
First, a number of texts produced by Robert Bostock and Ralph Smith revealed how 
the Scots and their sympathizers bemoaned and responded to “the mis-representation of our 
affairs at a distance, and the mis-constructions of such as want affection,” which “might 
possibly beget a misunderstanding of the reality and sincerity of our intentions and desires.”55 
They sought to offer “satisfaction against any aspersions” that had been “vented against the 
sincerity, candour and integrity of the proceedings of that army in the North,” adding that 
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“What God hath joined let no man separate.”56 They also bemoaned “such groundless 
suspicions and needless jealousies” which “bad instruments” had been “inventing and 
suggesting,” out of “their envy of our common happiness, and for their own private ends,” 
and they sought to counter claims which were said to have been made by “the sons of slander 
and perdition,” to the effect that the Scots had come “to fish in the troubled waters of 
England.”57 The Scottish commander, David Leslie, claimed that “it doth exceedingly grieve 
me to hear there are so many false reports spread of the carriage of this army,” and he 
protested about “the calumnies and misinformations invented and spread against our army, 
which I dare say do proceed for the most part from the activeness, industry and malice of our 
enemies, of purpose to render us hateful to our friends, and to divide… the kingdoms.”58 And 
the Scots pleaded with English readers to resist attempts to foment “jealousies” within and 
between the two kingdoms, and to try instead to prevent misunderstandings and differences, 
referring to “the faithful and careful endeavours of the Committee of Estates” for preserving 
“peace and amity” and “the happy union,” as well as to the need for stronger institutional 
ties.59  
In noting this drift towards the need to fire-fight mounting tension, it is important to 
note the extent to which it was driven by the need to respond to problems posed and 
objections raised by English Independents, rather than merely by royalists, in ways which 
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make it clear that the Anglo-Scottish public that had been imagined, conjured, and fostered 
had always been fragile and far from unified. Sometimes these responses involved English 
authors reflecting on “our brethren of Scotland,” as with a work from June 1646 entitled The 
Love and Faithfulnes of the Scottish Nation to the covenant and union. This not only referred 
to how “tongues and pens” were being “employed to work division… between kingdom and 
kingdom,” but was also explicitly framed as a response to “speeches of several Independent 
brethren,” and it involved quoting a previous parliamentarian declarations and speeches 
which had promoted “nearer association,” “more strict union,” and “the blessed union of two 
nations.”60 However, as the Scots became animated about “rumours” and “divers things 
murmured” against them, about the danger posed by “the enemies of this cause and 
covenant,” and about overt criticism regarding the conduct of their troops, they too 
complained about the lack of promised resources from England, and about “the pressing and 
unsupplied necessities of our army.”61 By 1646, indeed, as attention turned more obviously to 
the question of peace and settlement, the Scots were forced to discuss the circumstances 
surrounding the king’s arrival within their quarters, and to insist that they were “exhorting 
His Majesty to give satisfaction to the joint desires of both kingdoms,” rather than pursuing 
their own independent settlement.62 
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The problem facing the Scots, however, was that the existence of an Anglo-Scottish 
public sphere necessitated discussing such problems regarding the alliance very publicly, 
which then raised serious issues not just about the problems of cross-border political 
cooperation, but also about the nature of the British public sphere itself. This is perfectly 
clear from the furor surrounding the increasingly outspoken Scottish commentator, David 
Buchanan, who prefaced a volume of official Scottish papers in October 1645 by denouncing 
the strategies of “false-hearted and by-ended men,” and by bemoaning how the “simpler” sort 
were “deluded, and… led by the nose by the more specious lies of crafty and deceitful men.” 
As Thomason recognised, this pamphlet was printed in London by Bostock, and although 
Buchanan’s preface was quickly “forbidden” by the Scottish commissioners, even the more 
innocuous version by which it was replaced referred to “the many complaints against our 
army in this kingdom,” and to their attempt to unmask those responsible, as well as to their 
determination to “silence the clamours of the people, and bring them to a more charitable 
judgment.”63 
 Buchanan went much further than this, however, by offering a detailed critique of 
how the “union” worked in practice, and once again he did so in a highly public fashion. In 
one pamphlet, therefore, he complained about how the Scots were side-lined in the 
Committee of Both Kingdoms, and kept in the dark about sensitive intelligence, saying that 
“in the council of state the Scots have a long time been crossed in a high measure, by those 
who were against their incoming.” He also complained about how the Scots were 
misrepresented in the press, and about how these things were “believed by the simpler sort,” 
and he critiqued the “cunning” Independents and their attempts to undermine the Scots, who 
“must be cried upon as idle and lazy.” At one point, he exclaimed that “men must be 
                                                 
63 Collection of Divers Papers (BL, E.305/1), sig. A; Divers Papers Presented to the 
Honourable Houses of Parliament (London, 1645, S1231), sig. A2. 
23 
 
persuaded, induced and forced to come unto the Parliament with complaints against the 
Scots.”64 In another work, Buchanan reflected fondly on the early days of the Committee of 
Both Kingdoms, “wherein the Scots have a negative voice,” where nothing was done 
“without their knowledge and consent,” and where “all play[ed] overboard, and clandestine 
dealing being forbidden to both equally, upon the reason of the common interest of both.”65 
The problem, on his account, was that this had proved difficult to sustain, because of the 
actions of those who mistrusted the Scots and resented the idea of joint councils, who took 
steps towards “weaning them from their old friends in the City,” and who withheld key 
intelligence (including intercepted letters) and then established a sub-committee from which 
the Scots were excluded. For Buchanan, therefore, the problem was that things were 
increasingly “carried in hugger mugger, to the prejudice of the public service,” part of his 
wider critique of the appropriation of money and power by the Independent faction.66 
 What is striking about Buchanan’s account, however, is not just that he did not really 
offer a clear vision of what cross-border co-operation was supposed to look like, but also that 
to the extent that he did so his response to such problems involved stressing the importance of 
greater political openness. He justified aggressive Scottish print tactics by emphasizing the 
need to make public the proceedings of those acting in the service of the common cause, so 
that “it may be made manifest what good you have done alone, either by counsel in the 
Houses, or by action in the field.” Indeed, he explicitly addressed the question of secrecy, 
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publicity, and “the mysteries of state,” and opposed unnecessary attempts to keep things “in a 
mist by a mysterious prudency.”67 Moreover, this attitude became manifest not just in 
Buchanan’s incredibly frank discussions of factional politics and parliamentary processes, but 
also in his increasingly provocative attempts to publicize Scottish demands. This involved 
disregarding parliamentary privilege, and covering up the fact that he was working through 
friendly English stationers, although men like Thomason quickly realized that tracts like 
Some Papers given in by the Commissioners had been produced in London by Bostock, even 
though they purported to have been printed in Edinburgh by Tyler.68 Ultimately, Buchanan 
felt compelled to revert to promoting a national, rather than a confederal agenda, stressing 
that the covenanters were “the cause of the assembling of the parliament, of the continuance 
of it… and of the preservation of it.”69 
What such evidence suggests is that Scots like Buchanan were being forced to 
confront the difficulties involved in speaking a common political language with their English 
allies, that national interests had never entirely been removed from the covenanting agenda 
(or perhaps were apt to reappear when things were going badly), and that they were 
uncomfortable with the kind of “public sphere” that they may have helped to conjure, and it 
may never have been their intention to “normalise uncontrolled public debate.”70 The 
problem with the tactics that men like Buchanan deployed, however, was at least two-fold. 
First, the Scots provoked responses from English commentators on substantive issues, in 
terms of the proper nature and management of cross-border cooperation. In an explicit 
response to Buchanan in April 1646, Edward Bowles insisted that the Scots were the 
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“occasion,” rather than the “cause” of the Long Parliament, and made a series of points which 
raised rather different concerns regarding the nature of the union.71 He pointed out that while 
the Scots had been granted a role in England – i.e. on the Committee of Both Kingdoms – the 
English were not invited to participate in Scottish institutions, while in Scotlands Ancient 
Obligation William Prynne warned the Scots not to insist on their entitlement to determine 
the fate of the captive Charles I. In Prynne’s case, this was done in the interest of preserving a 
union, and he cited a biblical passage about the need to create “one nation” with “one king,” 
even if he referred to “our Scottish brethren’s deep engagements to our nation heretofore,” 
which he thought involved “a most strict obligation to them inviolably to maintain that 
ancient league of friendship… when so many seek to divide and dash us one against 
another… without giving the least just occasion of jealousie or complaint unto our nation by 
speech, action or violating the least title of their covenant and articles of agreement with the 
parliament.”72 Independents like Thomas Chaloner and Henry Marten, on the other hand, 
discussed the business of how to “dispose” of the king to rather different ends, with repeated 
and forthright denunciations of the Scots. By far the most explosive of these was even called 
An Unhappy Game at Scotch and English, and it represented a “full answer from England to 
the Scots papers of Scotland, wherein their Scotch mist and their fogs, their sayings and gain-
sayings, their jugglings, their windings and turnings… their breach of covenant, articles of 
treaty, their king-craft present design… their plots and intents for usurpation and government 
over us and our children” were “detected, discovered and presented to the view of the world,” 
as a “dreadful omen, all-arme and warning to the kingdom of England.”73 Amongst radical 
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Independents, therefore, the increasingly aggressive tone deployed by men like Buchanan 
provoked an equally provocative espousal of an explicitly English voice. 
 Secondly, English responses to the Scots raised questions about the legitimacy of 
Scottish tactics, not least in relation to the propriety of using cross-border tactics to advance 
Scottish interests in the English public sphere. This was evident most obviously in 
Parliament’s response to the Scots’ tendency to print their papers, as a means of explaining 
their views on the nature of the Anglo-Scottish alliance, on the nature of Anglo-Scottish 
treatises, and on the issues in dispute between the two partners.74 Such pamphlets not only 
generated official responses from Parliament, but also official censure of both Buchanan’s 
Truth its Manifest and his edition of the Scots’ papers.75 However, such disgruntlement is 
also clear in pamphlets by other English commentators. By pointing out that it was not just 
the Scots who were the victims of press criticism, and by highlighting “the very diurnalls 
which bespatter everybody,” Edward Bowles noted that whereas the Scots kept a tight control 
on the press at home they were much freer with print in England.76 Indeed, Bowles also 
contrasted the Scots’ demands for tighter control over English presses with Buchanan’s 
demands for political transparency, denying that Scots had been required to give an account 
of themselves in public, and insisting that the Scots commissioners were “men in public 
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employment, and should not be bandied by a private pen.”77 Bowles also added that “those 
that hate Independency in the church should not affect popularity in the state,” not least by 
drawing attention to the now-famous incident in June 1645 when the Scots had persuaded the 
English minister and press licenser, James Cranford, to publicize allegations against leading 
Independent grandees in relation to the Committee of Both Kingdoms.78 Finally, in a series of 
tracts by radical Independents, mocking reference was made to Scottish print tactics, with the 
claim that Independent pamphlets were printed in Edinburgh “as truly printed by Evan 
Tyler… as were the Scotch papers.”79  
 In other words, the story of the 1640s is one which not only involved calls for both 
political and religious union, but also more or less clear opposition to at least some of these 
ideals (especially in terms of church reform), and a lack of clarity over what union would 
look like and how it might work in practice. Inevitably, therefore, tensions emerged between 
English and Scottish voices over both the idea of union and the nature of any plausible 
collaboration, in terms of cross-border cooperation and state-building as well as church 
reform. As this happened, and as the Scots felt compelled to respond to skepticism regarding 
their role and performance, they found themselves exposing and critiquing constitutional 
arrangements, and provoking similar reflection on the part of their English allies. At this 
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point there was a real risk that, even if there remained some kind of cross-border constituency 
which supported the idea of union, it was all too easy for politicians and commentators on 
either side to expose the nature of such a union to ever closer scrutiny, and ultimately to 
revert to the language of national interests. When this happened, moreover, both sides also 
began to raise questions about the nature and workings of a cross-border public sphere, one of 
the very cornerstones upon which the covenanter-parliamentarian alliance had been built. 
 
The Scotish Dove and the formation of a British public 
It would be possible to take this story forward into 1647-8, and observe how a rather different 
cross-border alliance – between covenanters and English Presbyterians – led to abortive 
attempts to create a somewhat different Anglo-Scottish public; how the Scots’ Engagement 
with Charles I was aggressively justified in the English public sphere; and how both pro- and 
anti-Engager Scots fought their battles in print through London’s presses. It would also be 
possible to show how such tactics led English authors – like Marchamont Nedham – to 
produce anti-Scottish texts which appear to have been directed at Scottish audiences.80 
However, at this point it is possible to work towards a conclusion by returning to the Scotish 
Dove, a close examination of which reinforces the picture developed thus far. This reveals 
that its author, George Smith, was pro-Scottish, pro-covenant, and pro-union, and supportive 
of the Committee of Both Kingdoms, and that he placed great faith in “our brethren the 
Scots,” worked to ensure the success of the Anglo-Scottish alliance and strove to “knit” 
brethren together “in a more perpetual bond” of “union,” adding that “we are with them, and 
they with us, sworn to live and die together.”81 Even in November 1646, in the context of 
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mounting criticism of the Scots in print, Smith insisted that “this is a time for brethren to 
unite, not to dispute in orations.”82 Nevertheless, while Smith’s paper was consistently 
critical of sectaries, it also rejected jure divino Presbyterianism, questioned the value of 
Presbyterian petitioning, and although it made a clear effort to smooth over differences 
between Presbyterians and Independents, it could not help but to acknowledge their 
existence.83 Indeed, while Smith reassured readers about the military value of the Scots, 
defended them from critics and publicised their printed papers, he was not blindly supportive, 
and was certainly prepared to acknowledge the frustrations caused by their delayed entry into 
England, and to criticize the conduct of their army.84 Indeed, while Smith defended the Scots 
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to the last, even if this meant increasingly desperate attempts to bolster the alliance and to 
support their demands for money, it is also notable that when the king fled to the Scots in 
1646 he began to doubt whether they would honor the covenant. The Dove thus opined that “I 
hope our brethren of Scotland will remember their covenant as well as urge it to us; we shall 
surely never break with them, nor must the Parliament forbear to tell them they must not 
break with us.”85 Moreover, while Smith insisted that “[t]hey that are brethren will surely 
keep covenant and articles, or they must be held perfidious,” he seemed less than fully 
convinced, adding that “I hope the former, and cannot suppose the latter can be,” while also 
acknowledging “cause of fear.”86  
 More importantly, it was perfectly obvious that Smith was an English author who was 
loyal to the “rights of the English nation,” and his rhetoric about the eponymous “dove” is 
highly revealing.87 Smith insisted, therefore, that “my Dove is Scotish, but myself English,” 
adding that his was an English newspaper which had merely adopted the motto of the 
covenanter army, and that “the Dove is bound to love the Scottish nation for England’s sake, 
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so long as they love England.”88 Smith’s conceit, indeed, was that the Dove was “sent out” as 
an intelligencer “between” England and Scotland; that she was an “innocent” who “flies 
between, to bring intelligence / from thence to us, and unto them from hence;” and that she 
was “impartial in her praises and dispraises.”89 Indeed, Smith responded to the claim that the 
Dove was a “perfect Scotist” by pointing out that some readers accused him of being a 
“factious sectary.”90 
Such evidence makes it clear that, rather than being a covenanter newspaper, the 
Scotish Dove in some senses embodied the kind of British voice that was so important to 
harnessing and fostering a collaborative cross-border community or public, and to the 
development of the cross-border Anglo-Scottish political alliance. The Dove thus highlights 
the way in which print was used as means of fostering a sense of brotherly unity, and of 
responding to the problems that emerged during the 1640s. Smith both embodied the 
possibilities for creating an Anglo-Scottish public and the difficulties that such a project 
faced, and in the end he was an imperfect “Scotist.” That the paper’s run came to an end in 
late 1646 reflected not so much an attempt by the Independents to undermine the Scottish 
alliance – Smith’s run-ins with Parliament in 1646 involved its treatment of the French – as 
the fact that an Anglo-Scottish constituency of opinion, or public, proved difficult to sustain 
in the face of challenges to cross-border cooperation and state-building which had become 
perfectly clear in print.91  
                                                 
88 Scotish Dove (25 Dec. 1646), sig. A2v; Scotish Dove No. 16 (26 Jan.-6 Feb. 1644), 120. 
89 Scotish Dove No. 1 (13-20 Oct. 1643), 1; Scotish Dove No. 2, 9; Scotish Dove No. 46, 361; 
Scotish Dove No. 70 (14-21 Feb. 1645), 548; Scotish Dove (25 Dec. 1646), sigs. Av, A2v. 
90 Scotish Dove (25 Dec. 1646), sig. A2v. 
91 On 10 September 1646, the committee of foreign affairs was ordered to examine the 
printer, publisher, and author of issue 146 (5-12 August), and on 24 September, Smith, as 
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The Scotish Dove thus neatly encapsulates what can be learned by rethinking the 
relationship between print culture and political borders in the early modern period. Rather 
than simply being exported from Scotland to England, printed texts can be shown to have 
been produced and distributed – both collaboratively and independently – by both English 
parliamentarians and Scottish covenanters, and to have flowed in both directions. Examined 
closely, such texts reveal less the existence of discrete publics than the importance of 
overlapping and interlocking cultures in England and Scotland, thereby providing a means of 
challenging historiographical claims about the importance of “British history” which rest on 
shaky assumptions about the interaction between discrete polities and publics, and unhelpful 
debates about the relative importance of Scottish covenanters and English parliamentarians in 
forging the English revolution. Through sensitivity to the practices and rhetoric of Anglo-
Scottish print culture, in other words, it is possible to emphasize the importance of cross-
border attempts to develop a joint agenda and a shared enterprise, rather than to postulate the 
imposition of a Scottish agenda upon an English public sphere, in some sort of “Scottish 
moment.”  
More broadly, such evidence also reveals the symbiotic relationship between 
developments in public culture and the process of state formation. This makes it possible to 
think about Anglo-Scottish political cooperation and British state building as something that 
involved being responsive to and building upon the foundations provided by a nascent British 
constituency or public, and to recognize that the development of something approaching a 
                                                                                                                                                        
author of the Dove, was brought to the bar of the House of Lords, and charged regarding 
comments “against the French king:” Commons Journals, iv. 664; Lords Journals, viii. 504. 
See: Scotish Dove No. 152 (16-23 Sept. 1646), 43; Scotish Dove No. 150 (2-9 Sept. 1646), 
31; Scotish Dove No. 143 (15-22 July 1646), 753; Scotish Dove No. 148 (19-26 Aug. 1646), 
14. 
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constitutional union between England and Scotland British made it increasingly important to 
engage with a wider community of citizens. At the same time, focusing on the importance of 
print culture for fostering, enlarging, and sustaining this kind of British public after 1642 also 
makes it clear that print and publicity inevitably became the means by which contemporary 
commentators navigated the tensions between covenanters and parliamentarians, such that 
when Anglo-Scottish interests – a workable union – looked like giving way to national 
sentiments, there emerged very vocal resistance to both the legitimacy of using print as a 
cross-border device, as well as to the cooperation that it was intended to promote. As such, by 
exploring the connection between cross-border print culture and British state-building it 
becomes clear just how powerful the print medium had become as a means of intensifying 
contemporary debates, first in the process of fostering union and then as part of the process 
by which the union fractured.  
What certainly becomes clear, finally, is that cross-border co-operation in the realm of 
print culture was both possible and observable, but also that it was difficult to sustain in the 
face of differences about political substance, political process, and political style. In addition 
to tensions over church and state, therefore, English and Scottish “brethren” struggled to 
remained united around a common language and political culture, and differing views about 
the role and utility of print culture ensured that pamphlets and newspapers could become 
tools not just for reflecting and promoting collaboration, but also for drawing attention to, and 
perhaps also exacerbating tensions, not least those which emerged amid experimentation 
regarding institutional arrangements. As such, there may be scope to argue that the print 
practices associated with a putative Anglo-Scottish public might actually have played a part 
in fueling the political tensions which resulted in the Cromwellian “conquest” of Scotland 
(1650-1). More interestingly, however, it might also be worth speculating whether the 
experience of the 1640s fostered habits of thought and practice about public politics which 
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informed and enhanced cross-border co-operation, collaboration, and even conspiracy in later 
decades, not least after the Restoration, when English Whigs and Scottish covenanters once 
again had the opportunity to focus on what they had in common, rather than on what divided 
them. 
 
